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Sammendrag: Ian Castles og David Henderson har 
kritisert IPCCs spesialrapport om 
utslippsfremskrivninger. Kritikkens hovedpunkt er at 
det i scenariefremskrivningene ikke er foretatt 
korreksjoner for kjøpekraftspariteter når man har 
sammenlignet regionale inntektsnivåer. Konsekvensen 
er at fattige land fremstår som fattigere enn de faktisk 
er. En slik overdrivelse av inntektsgapet mellom 
fattige og rike land i basisåret fører til fremskrivninger 
med for høy økonomisk vekst i de fattige landene, 
ettersom scenariene er konstruert med sikte på at 
inntektsgapet mellom fattige og rike land reduseres. 
Castles og Henderson hevder at overdrevet 
inntektsvekst innebærer at også utslippsveksten blir 
overdrevet. Det Castles og Henderson overser 
imidlertid en annen sentral drivkraft i IPCC-
scenariene. Det er i dag en betydelig forskjell i 
energieffektivitet mellom fattige og rike land. Vi 
fremhever at ved å unnlate å foreta korreksjoner for 
kjøpekraftspariteter, overdriver IPCC ikke bare 
inntektsforskjellene mellom fattige og rike land. De 
overdriver også forskjellene i utslipp pr. produsert 
enhet og dermed potensialet for å øke 
energieffektiviteten i de fattige landene. En annen 
sentral drivkraft i IPCC-scenariene er at forskjellen 
forskjellen i energieffektivitet også blir redusert over 
tid. Vi viser i dette notatet at disse to feilene 
nøytraliserer hverandre. Vi mener derfor at Castles og 
Henderson ikke har rett i sin kritikk når de 
konkluderer med at manglende korreksjoner for 
kjøpekraftspariteter har medført en overdrevet 
utslippsvekst i IPCC-scenariene.. 
   
Abstract: Ian Castles and David Henderson have 
criticized IPCC’s Special Report on Emissions 
Scenarios (SRES) (IPCC, 2000) for using market 
exchange rates (MER) instead of purchasing power 
parities (PPP) when converting regional GDP into a 
common denominator. The consequence is that poor 
countries generally appear to be poorer than they 
actually are. An overstated income gap between rich 
and poor countries in the base year gives rise to 
projections of too high economic growth in the poor 
countries because the scenarios are constructed with 
the aim of reducing the income gap. Castles and 
Henderson claim that overstated economic growth 
means that greenhouse gas emissions are overstated as 
well. However, because closure of the emission 
intensity gap between the rich and the poor parts of the 
world is another important driving force in the 
scenarios, we argue that the use of MER in the SRES 
scenarios has not caused an overestimation of the 
global emission growth because the two types of 
errors effectively neutralize one another. 
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1 Introduction and background 
Ian Castles of the National Centre for Development Studies at Australian National University, 
formerly the head of Australia’s national office of statistics, and David Henderson of the 
Westminster Business School, formerly the chief economist of the OECD, have put together a 
critique of the IPCC’s Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) (Castles and 
Henderson, 2003a). This was picked up and commented upon by The Economist (13 February 
2003: Hot Potato: The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change had better check its 
calculations.) The main thrust of the criticism is that the GDPs for the four world regions1 
covered in the SRES were derived using market exchange rates (MER) that were not 
corrected with respect to purchasing power parities (PPP). The consequence is that non-
OECD countries generally appear to be poorer than they actually are. This is important 
because the size of the income gap between rich and poor countries is a key driving force in 
the scenarios. A basic premise has been that the income gap between rich and poor countries 
has to be considerably reduced by the end of the century. Castles and Henderson agree that 
such a convergence is a reasonable premise for the scenarios, but point to the fact that an 
overstated income gap in 1990/2000 gives rise to exaggerated projected economic growth in 
the poor countries in order to reduce the gap “with corresponding implications, other things 
being equal, for energy use and for CO2 emissions.” (Castles and Henderson, 2003a, p. 169).  
Nakićenović and colleagues, a group of authors connected with the SRES report, responded to 
the critique (see Nakićenović et al., 2003). First, they point out that some of the SRES 
scenarios in fact were based on PPP-based exchange rates. Second, they dispute that their use 
of MER instead of PPP measures in other scenarios was inappropriate. Furthermore, they 
claim that it is incorrect “both theoretically and practically” (p. 208) that lowering the GDP 
growth rate assumptions would mean lower emissions than reported in SRES. The theoretical 
argument made by Nakićenović et al. is in short that “technological change is ceteris paribus 
closely linked with income growth, or more precisely with the aggregate rate of 
macroeconomic productivity growth, usually represented by the growth of per capita GDP.” 
(page 208)   
In a follow-up paper, the critique of the use of MER-based GDP measures in the SRES 
scenarios was repeated and specified further (Castles and Henderson, 2003b). Among other 
things, it was pointed out that the use of MER-based GDP measures in the SRES scenarios 
was somewhat sloppy, as, for example, in figure 3-13 on page 125 in IPCC (2000), which 
clearly overstates the energy intensities of the poorer regions.  
An unpublished paper by Manne and Richels (2003) applies the simulation model MERGE to 
analyze the extent to which the use of MER gave rise to overstated emission growth. The 
authors conclude that the use of MER instead of PPP affects the projected future emission 
growth only slightly – in part because while the use of MER means that the GDP growth in 
overstated, it also means that the potential for improved energy intensities in the developing 
countries is overstated as well. 
In approaching this debate we first of all note that it should be possible to agree upon the fact 
that market actors are affected by market exchange rates, and thus in principle these rates 
should be employed in the models used to illustrate market economic behavior. On the other 
hand, to the extent that the economic growth in the scenarios are motivated by a wish to close 
the income gap between poor and rich countries, a PPP-based conversion should be applied as 
1 The four regions are as follows: (1) OECD: OECD as of 1990; (2) REF: Reforming economies 
encompassing former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; (3) ASIA: Non-OECD Asia including 
Oceania; and (4) ALM: the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. The GDP is given in 1990 US$. 
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the basis for certain parts of the scenario's design criteria. It is the use of GDP measures in 
this part of the scenario design that we discuss in the following. 
The purpose of this paper is to prove that there is a surprisingly straightforward and serious 
weakness of the critique put forward by Castles and Henderson. If it is accepted that the 
SRES-scenarios overstate the GDP growth in the poor countries, the key question is whether 
this implies overstated emissions growth in SRES. Castles and Henderson do not really 
analyze that question. They just maintain that the SRES scenarios overstate emissions growth 
because “the partial derivative of emissions with respect to output is positive, since it is the 
output – the real GDP and final expenditure – that gives rise to the emissions” (Castles and 
Henderson, 2003b, p. 20). We want to show that this argument represents an 
oversimplification.  
Although we agree that it might be reasonable to use PPP-based conversion factors in this 
particular context, Castles and Henderson have by no means proved that the MER-based 
SRES scenarios overestimate the emissions growth. The point is that there are not one, but 
two gaps to be closed in the scenarios. The first one is the income gap. The second one is the 
technology or emission-intensity gap. Using MER constitutes an overestimation of the 
economic growth necessary to close or narrow the income gap. On the other hand, it also 
represents a corresponding overestimation of the potential for energy efficiency 
improvements in the developing countries. In other words, the use of MER overvalues the 
energy efficiency improvements that will take place in the developing countries in a process 
where the emission-intensity gap is narrowed. Hence, the SRES scenarios are based on two 
mistakes that draw in different directions, and in fact these two inaccuracies neutralize one 
another. We thus argue that if gap closure is accepted as the driving force behind both 
economic growth and reduction of emission intensities in the non-OECD countries, the choice 
of exchange rate is irrelevant in the context of the SRES scenarios.2 
As mentioned above, Nakićenović et al. argue, in line with our argument, that theoretically 
there is no reason to assume that overstated economic growth should mean overstated 
emissions growth. However, we find the theoretical arguments as formulated by Nakićenović 
et al. to be unclear and circuitous in relation to the truly simple relationships we are dealing 
with. While Nakićenović et al. deny that any mistakes were made in relation to the use of PPP 
corrections, we argue that in fact two mistakes have been made – but fortunately they negate 
each other. 
Manne and Richels (2003) touch upon the crucial issue, but do not clarify the fundamental 
arguments. It is our view that before the question is analyzed within a CGE model like 
MERGE, these fundamental arguments should be clarified. What both papers (Nakićenović et 
al. and Manne and Richels) lack is a simple and straightforward discussion of the basic 
numerical assumptions made by the SRES team and to what extent they lead to overstating 
the emission growth. We will apply a simple theoretical framework as the basis for that 
discussion. We argue that both types of gap closure mentioned above have been important 
driving forces in the scenarios, and provide a numerical example as a direct follow up to that 
presented by Castles and Henderson. Both the theoretical framework and the numerical 
example demonstrate how the two types of mistakes neutralize one another. 
                                                     
2 In relation to the B1 scenario, which Castles and Henderson use as the starting point for their 
numerical examples, IPCC (2000) states the following: “The rather high rates in energy intensity 
reduction in the B1 stem also from the explicit assumption that less industrialized regions catch-up” (p. 
206). 
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Figure 1: Numbers from the SRES scenarios: CO2/GDP in the four world regions 
relative to CO2/GDP in the OECD region in the four main scenarios. GDP levels are 
not PPP corrected. 
2  The two gaps and a simple model 
It is evident from IPCC (2000) that two types of gap closure have been the main driving 
forces behind the design of the SRES scenarios. First, the income gap between the rich and 
poor regions is an important driving force behind the projected economic growth in the poor 
region. That is stated explicitly (IPCC (2000), p. 7). Second, the scenarios are based on 
assumptions about technological catching up in relation to energy efficiency. In other words, 
the converging of the emission-intensity gaps between OECD and the other world regions is a 
driving force behind the emission-intensity drops in these regions. Although it is not very 
explicitly stated in IPCC (2000) that this type of gap closure is an important driving force, the 
numbers leave no doubt (see figure 1, which shows the development of the emission 
intensities in the SRES scenarios in the different world regions in relation to the emission 
intensity in the OECD region).  
Castles and Henderson do not criticize the numerical assumptions related to the emission-
intensity gap or the income gap in period 2. Nor do they criticize the assumptions related to 
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economic growth or the choice of emission-intensity level in the rich part of the world (see 
the numerical examples in Castles and Henderson, 2003a, p. 169). It is therefore reasonable to 
interpret Castles and Henderson as if they accept the assumed degree of catching up at least as 
far as the income gap is concerned: In their numerical illustrations, for example, they apply 
the same income gap as assumed by the IPCC team. Furthermore, Castles and Henderson do 
not criticize the degree of gap closure related to the emission intensities. Their concern is that 
assumptions related to the situation in period 2 should be made using PPP values as the 
starting point. They criticize applying the assumed degree of income inequality between rich 
and poor in 2100 to income levels that are not PPP corrected. The question is to what extent 
the criticism is relevant in relation to the estimated emissions. 
To shed light on this question, we analyze the issue within a simple model. Thus, we consider 
a world that exists in two periods and includes only two regions; one rich (R), and one poor 
(P). For simplicity, we assume that there are constant and equal numbers of citizens in the 
two regions over time. Further, we define: 
Ert: Emissions of greenhouse gases in region r = R, P in period t = 1, 2. 
Et: Global emissions in period t. 
Prt: Price level in region r in period t. 
Yrt: GDP in region r in period t measured in PPP. 
Xrt = PrtYrt: GDP in region r in period t measured in MER. 
 
 We define γIPCC and εIPCC as the size of the income gap and emission-intensity gap in 2100, 
respectively, as assumed by IPCC. Furthermore, we define YP2IPCC and XP2IPCC as the size of 
GDP in the poor region in period 2, measured after and before PPP corrections, respectively, 
if the IPCC scenario methodology is applied. From the above arguments and definitions it 
follows that: 
 IPCC
R
IPCC
P
X
X γ≡
2
2 . (1) 
Correspondingly, we define YPC&H  as PPP-corrected GDP in the poor region if the Castles 
and Henderson methodology is applied. This gives: 
 IPCC
R
HC
P
Y
Y γ≡
2
&
2 . (2)  
We define EP2IPCC and EP2C&H as estimated emissions in the poor region if the IPCC and the 
Castles and Henderson methodologies are applied, respectively. In the IPCC case we have: 
 IPCC
R
R
IPCC
P
IPCC
P
X
E
X
E
ε≡
2
2
2
2
, (3) 
while the Castles and Henderson methodology gives: 
 IPCC
R
R
HC
P
HC
P
Y
E
Y
E
ε≡
2
2
&
2
&
2
. (4)  
To further simplify the discussion, we have made a number of other assumptions. First, we 
assume that price levels are constant over time3 and normalize the relative price levels: 
                                                     
3 If inflation is to be taken into account, both the definition of the income gap as and the definition of 
the emission intensity gap would have to be corrected for inflation. This correction would not affect our 
conclusions. 
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 PR1 = PR2 = 1 ⇒     YRt = XRt., (5) 
 PP1 = PP2 = P <1.    (6) 
Furthermore, we assume that there is constant emission intensity in the rich region and 
disregard economic growth in this region. Hence, the emissions in the rich region are 
constant. We define GDP and emissions in the rich regions as numeraires:  
 YR1 = YR2 = 1       ⇒     XR1 = XR2  = 1  (7) 
 ER1 = ER2  = 1  (8) 
We now apply equations (1), (2), (5) - (7) together with the fact that PYP2IPCC  =  XP2IPCC. This 
gives the following: 
 .1
2
&
2 <= P
Y
Y
IPCC
P
HC
P  (9)  
Hence, YP2IPCC  >  YP2C&H, which confirms that the IPCC methodology overstates the economic 
growth in the poor region, as claimed by Castles and Henderson.  
The crucial question is, however, whether overstated economic growth in the poor region also 
means overstated emission growth. From equations (3), (4) and (5)-(9) we have: 
 IPCC
P
IPCC
PIPCC
HC
P
HC
P
PY
E
Y
E
2
2
&
2
&
2 ≡≡ ε . (10) 
Using (9) and (10) it is simple algebra to reach the conclusion that: 
 EP2IPCC  = EP2C&H (11) 
As the estimated emissions in the rich region are unaffected by the choice of methodology, it 
follows that total emissions will similarly be unaltered by those choices. In other words, from 
the model we conclude that the choice of MER or PPP as basis is unimportant with respect to 
global emissions in period 2, if gap closure related to both the income gap and the emission-
intensity gap is the important driving force in the scenario. 
However, the choices with respect to the degree of gap closure related to the income and the 
emissions intensity gaps are important. Furthermore, the assumptions about emission intensity 
and growth in this region are crucial. The numerical assumptions at these crucial points made 
in the SRES scenarios could and should be discussed, but we think that the approach taken by 
Castles and Henderson heads in the wrong direction. As the very simple model exercise above 
shows, the full set of crucial numerical assumptions have to be considered in relation to each 
other. 
3 A numerical example 
Our argument is in the following illustrated by a numerical example related to the B1 IMAGE 
scenario. We use this scenario as a point of departure in the numerical example because 
Castles and Henderson (2003a), p. 169, also use this scenario as their basis (see also Castles et 
al., 2003b). The numerical example is set out in Table 1 and Table 2.  
There were two noticeable gaps between rich and poor regions in 1990. First, there was an 
income gap as the ratios of per capita GDP in the OECD region to that of the non-OECD 
countries were 20.7 and 8.1 when we apply the MER- and PPP-based GDP measures, 
respectively. Second, there was an emission-intensity gap as the ratios of per GDP unit CO2 
emissions in the non-OECD region to that of the OECD countries were 4.1 and 1.6 when we 
apply the MER- and PPP-based GDP measures, respectively.  
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The scenario assumes that by 2100 the ratio of per capita GDP in the OECD countries to that 
of the non-OECD countries will have fallen to 1.9 using MER-based GDP measures. 
Furthermore, the scenario assumes that the emission intensity gap drops to 1.2 by the end of 
the century (using MER). In addition, the B1 IMAGE scenario for the OECD region projects 
an increase in GDP per capita between 1990 and 2100, by a factor of 3.9. 
IPCC (2000) does not provide information on the development of the exchange rates in the 
B1 IMAGE scenario. We have therefore in this numerical example, which is based on this 
scenario, assumed that the PPP-correction factors are constant from 1990 to 2100. From this 
follows that the income gap in PPP-based terms are more than closed, i.e. the non-OECD 
region has a higher real income per capita in 2100 than the OECD-region, a result which 
probably not has been intentional. Moreover, it has probably not been the intention that the 
emission-intensity gap is more than closed in real terms, as the emission intensity is lower in 
the non-OECD region compared to the OECD region in PPP-based terms. 
Suppose now that we follow the thinking behind the numerical example set out in Castles and 
Hendersen. (2003a, p. 169), and assume that the income gap in 2100 (the 1.9 ratio) is applied, 
but to the PPP-based GDP measures. The economic growth factor (the 3.9 ratio) of the OECD 
region is kept unchanged. The emission intensity gap (the 1.2 ratio) is applied, but to the PPP-
based intensity measures. This numerical example is set out in Table 1. The result is, in 
accordance with the criticism put forward by Castles and Henderson, that the world's GDP per 
capita in 2100 is reduced by almost 50 percent.  
However, in accordance with the general results set out above, the CO2 emissions are 
unaffected by the change from MER- to PPP-based assumptions. As explained in section II, 
the important point is that the use of MER-based income comparisons in 1990 implies two 
errors because both the income gap and the emission intensity gap are overstated. The key 
variable, global carbon emissions, is on the other hand correctly measured. Nevertheless, the 
use of MER-based income comparisons overstates economic growth as well as the potential 
for energy efficiency improvements in the poor region. Fortunately, these two mistakes cancel 
each other out. 
Table 1. The B1 IMAGE as set out in IPCC (2000) using market exchange rates 
(MER). B1 IMAGE adjusted using purchasing power parity (PPP). 
 
  PPP- Population GDP GDP GDP/Cap. GDP/Cap. CO2 CO2/GDP CO2/GDP
 correction  (MER) (PPP) (MER) (PPP) (MER) (PPP)
  103 1012  US$ 103 US$/capita 109 tC     tC/103 US$ 
1990                   
OECD 1.00 799 16.5 16.5 20.6 20.6 2.83 171.5 171.5
Non-OECD 2.55 4480 4.5 11.4 1.0 2.5 3.17 708.5 277.6
World 1.33 5279 21.0 27.9 4.0 5.3 6.0 286.1 214.9
2100 SRES B1 IMAGE (MER-based)     
OECD 1.00 1032 82.3 82.3 79.8 79.8 1.1 13.4 13.4
Non-OECD 2.55 6016 246.1 630.1 40.9 104.4 4.1 16.7 6.5
World 2.17 7048 328.4 712.4 46.6 101.1 5.2 15.8 7.3
2100 PPP-scenario based on B1 IMAGE 
OECD 1.00 1032 82.3 82.3 79.8 79.8 1.1 13.4 13.4
Non-OECD 2.55 6016 96.4 246.1 16.0 40.9 4.1 42.5 16.7
World 1.84 7048 178.8 328.4 25.4 46.6 5.2 29.1 15.8
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Table 2. Average annual GDP-growth 1990-2100. Percentage. 
 
   GDP GDP GDP/Cap. GDP/Cap. CO2
  (MER) (PPP) (MER) (PPP)
SRES B1 IMAGE (MER-based) 
OECD 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.2 -0.9
Non-OECD 3.7 3.7 3.4 3.4 0.2
World 2.5 3.0 2.3 2.7 -0.1
PPP-scenario based on B1 IMAGE 
OECD 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.2 -0.9
Non-OECD 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.6 0.2
World 2.0 2.3 1.7 2.0 -0.1
 
4 Conclusion 
The main point of the Castles-Henderson critique of the SRES scenarios is that the PPP 
should have been used as the basis for measuring relative income in different regions of the 
world. We agree that the use of market exchange rates in the comparison of regional income 
levels in the SRES scenarios could be criticized. Although some scenarios are presented using 
both MER- and PPP-based GDP measures, PPP-based GDP measures should generally have 
been applied in the scenario when the degree of gap closure with respect to the income levels 
and emission intensities was fixed.  
Nevertheless, we have argued that it is unlikely that the use of MER in the SRES scenarios 
has caused an overestimation of the global emission growth. If we expect a certain degree of 
closure of the emission-intensity gap between the rich and the poor parts of the world to 
accompany a convergence of the per capita income between the regions, the choice of MER 
instead of exchange rates based on PPP does not lead to an overestimation of the emission 
growth. The reason is that the use of MER implies that the scenario designers made two 
mistakes that cancel each other out. On the one hand, using MER results in overestimating 
economic growth in the poor regions. On the other hand, using MER results in overestimating 
the emission-intensity gap between rich and poor regions in the base year and consequently 
also the emission-intensity improvements in this region. 
The important question turns out to be whether the SRES scenarios are based on realistic 
assumptions related to the convergence of the emission-intensity gaps and the income gaps, as 
well as the future development of the emission intensity and the GDP level in the rich region. 
A critique of the SRES scenarios should analyze these questions rather than focusing on the 
MER/PPP distinction, although we think it is appropriate that Castles and Henderson point to 
the importance of using PPP-based measures as basis for inter-regional comparisons. 
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